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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The recent Equality Act 2010 includes a revised definition of “victimisation”, which (in the Act’s most litigated 
field of employment) prohibits employers from victimising workers who use the legislation. The underlying 
mischief should be the deterrent effect upon litigants, or potential litigants (the “chilling” effect). One particularly 
pernicious deterrent is the victimisation, not of the complainant, but of a third party, such as the complainant’s 
spouse, loved one, or friend, “the most ancient form of vengeance”. Yet the revised definition does not address the 
deterrent effect per se, and specifically excludes third party victimisation from its reach.  
This paper explores, first, why the deterrent mischief and the chilling effect should underpin the 
victimisation provision, so that it addresses third party victimisation, second, the potential of existing alternative 
solutions in domestic law; and third, the position EU law, and under the United States’ Civil Rights Act 1964. It 
concludes that the best existing solution lies in EU general principles, but for the sake of certainty, a simple 
amendment to the existing formula is required, which would solve the problem without any undue side-effects. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
At the end of the movie Spartacus, the Romans famously threaten to crucify all their captured slaves unless 
Spartacus gives himself up. This threat persuaded the hero to concede defeat and save his comrades. As he begins 
to stand, Spartacus is saved by the loyalty of his fellow slaves, each of whom declares: “I am Spartacus!” The 
point - for the present purpose - is that Spartacus was moved to give up his life by a threat to others with whom he 
had empathy. In this case there was a bond of comradeship. In others, the emotional exploitation uses spouses or 
civil partners, family, loved ones, close friends, or even work colleagues. The most commonly litigated area of 
discrimination law is the field of employment. Of course, one would not expect to find such dramatic threats in the 
field of employment discrimination. But in principle, the practice exists, as characterised by Richard A. Posner: 
“To retaliate against a man by hurting a member of his family is an ancient method of revenge, and is not unknown 
in the field of labor relations”.
1
 
In the field on employment, many scenarios involving this “third party victimisation” could arise. Most 
can be grouped into three Classes, as shown here.  
A worker issues discrimination proceedings against her employer (the “protected act”) and: 
 
Class No. 1: Same employer - same workplace. 
In retaliation, the employer fires the worker’s fiancé (who worked in the same undertaking). 
 
Variations on this would be that the retaliation falls short of dismissal (e.g. rejecting a promotion 
application, withholding an expected pay rise, giving a poor appraisal), or that the victim is the 
claimant’s spouse or civil partner, relative, loved one, close friend, or a work colleague. 
 
No. 2: Same employer - different undertaking. As above, save that the fiancé worked for another 
undertaking owned or managed by the same employer. 
 
No. 3: Different employer. As above, save that the fiancé worked for an undertaking owned or managed 
by a friend or relative of the employer, who fired him on the say-so of the employer, or out of tacit 
sympathy. 
 
In these scenarios, the employer’s action would deter the claimant and other workers (the “chilling” effect) from 
using the discrimination legislation. 
The recent Equality Act 2010 includes a revised definition of “victimisation” (see below), which 
prohibits employers from victimising workers who use the legislation. The mischief here should be the deterrent 
effect upon the complainant and the chilling effect. Yet the revised definition was not drafted with this mischief in 
mind, and it specifically excludes third party victimisation from its reach. The exclusion of this particularly 
pernicious form of victimisation leaves the statute open to abuse by employers, who may carefully (or in some 
cases, instinctively), target the complainant’s spouse or civil partner, relative, loved one, close friend, or work 
colleague. 
This paper, first, argues that the mischief of deterrents and the chilling effect should inform the primary 
purpose of the victimisation provision, and in doing so, it should cover third party victimisation. The argument 
uses EU case law and legislative history of the equality Directives, the case law of United States Civil Rights Act 
1964, and by way of analogy, criminal contempt of court. Second, it evaluates the potential of existing alternative 
solutions in domestic law. Third, it explores the approach towards third party victimisation itself, in the EU 
equality Directives, the ECJ and its various international influences, including the United States. It concludes that 
the best existing solution lies in EU general principles, but for the sake of certainty, a simple amendment to the 
existing formula is required, which would solve the problem without any undue side-effects. 
 
 
THE DOMESTIC LEGISLATION 
 
The shortcoming of the revised victimisation provision is apparent in the wording:  
 
Equality Act 2010 
27 Victimisation 
(1) A person (A) victimises another person (B) if A subjects B to a detriment because— 
(a) B does a protected act, or 
(b) A believes that B has done, or may do, a protected act. 
 
The “protected acts” comprise bringing or supporting proceedings, making allegations, or “doing any other thing” 
under or in connection with the Act. Giving false evidence or information, or making a false allegation, is not a 
protected act if it was done in bad faith. 
For liability, it is necessary that (1) that the claimant has done a protected act (or the defendant believes 
he has, or will do it), (2) the defendant subjected the claimant to a detriment (3) because the claimant did the 
protected act. This formula fails to address the mischief in (at least) two ways. First, it requires harm (“detriment”) 
to the victim, which rules out cases where the employer’s act in the event did not harm the victim, but still sent out 
a signal to others not the complain, and so had a chilling effect. This could happen where an employer supplies a 
negative, or no, reference, that in the event did not affect the victim’s job prospects.2 Second, and critical to the 
present context, the first element specifies that the person victimised must be the person who did the protected 
act,
3
 thus specifically excluding third party victimisation from its reach. 
 
 
THE DETERRENT MISCHIEF, THE CHILLING EFFECT, AND VICTIMISATION 
 
 
The obvious initial question is whether the deterrent effect should be central to the victimisation provision. The 
victimisation provision operates on an individualistic basis, although tribunals may now provide broader remedies 
affecting the whole workforce.
4
 This does not mean necessarily that it has no broader purpose. One would 
logically and instinctively consider that it should remove the fear of using the legislation: the deterrent effect. It 
does so by dissuading the employer from victimising anyone using it. Assuming this is so, those deterred would 
comprise any worker who became aware of their employer’s willingness to victimise (perhaps evidenced by an act 
of actual or threatened victimisation of a colleague). The fear, if anything, is deepened if the threat is to a spouse or 
civil partner, relative, loved one, close friend, or even a work colleague. Where the threat in the event does not 
harm the claimant, or fails to deter an exceptionally robust complainant, it might still deter others. This is where 
the chilling effect, in itself, becomes important. Thus, if the mischief addressed by the victimisation provision were 
the deterrent effect, the provision should include the chilling effect and third party victimisation.  
In support of this, there are three legal indicators suggesting that the deterrent mischief should underpin 
the notion of  victimisation in employment discrimination law. These can be found in EU law (the jurisprudence of 
the ECJ and the history of the equality Directives), the US Civil Rights Act 1964, and by analogy with contempt of 
court.  
 
(i) EU Law 
 
First, the history of the victimisation provisions in the equality Directives
5
 can be traced to the ECJ judgment in 
Coote v Granada.6 The original sex discrimination Directive, the Equal Treatment Directive 76/207/EEC, did not, 
except for one specified instance (dismissal as a reaction to bringing a claim, Article 7), expressly outlaw 
victimisation. However, it was held that victimisation cases falling outside Article 7 could succeed under the general 
ambition of Article 6, which provided that member states should “introduce into their national legal systems such 
measures as are necessary to enable all persons who consider themselves wronged by failure to apply to them the 
principle of equal treatment ... to pursue their claims by judicial process ...”. In this case, following her dismissal for 
pregnancy, Mrs Coote sued her employer. Subsequently, and after those proceedings were dead, the employer 
refused to provide her a job reference and Mrs Coote sued again, this time for victimisation. The issue was whether 
Article 6 covered retaliation against former employees. The ECJ found for Ms Coote, stating: 
 
The principle of effective judicial control laid down in Article 6 ... would be deprived of an essential part 
of its effectiveness if the protection which it provides did not cover measures ... as in ... this case... . Fear 
of such measures, where no legal remedy is available against them, might deter workers who considered 
themselves the victims of discrimination from pursuing their claims by judicial process, and would 
consequently be liable seriously to jeopardise implementation of the aim pursued by the Directive.
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The policy supporting this decision, expressed in the second sentence, goes beyond the facts of Coote, and 
suggests that any retaliation that might deter workers from using the discrimination legislation should be unlawful. 
Further, as Mrs Coote's proceedings were concluded, the employer’s act could not have deterred her. The only 
people possibly deterred in this case were others. Thus, the chilling effect, rather than harm to the individual, is the 
principal mischief identified by the Coote judgment.  
Some broader, less specific sentiments can be found in the legislative history to the equality Directives. 
The European Commission stated that the protection against victimisation in the Race Directive 2000/43/EC was 
“a crucial element in allowing individuals to assert their rights”,
8
 and when advancing the role of equality bodies it 
stated that “many victims of discrimination do not proceed to court with their complaints because of the cost and 
for fear of victimisation”.
9 
In relation to the Framework Directive 2000/78/EC, the Commission expressed similar 
concern about victimisation, although appeared to envisage that the principal complainant and victim were the 
same person: “Effective legal protection must include protection against retaliation. Victims may be deterred from 
exercising their rights due to the risk of retaliation. Since fear of dismissal is generally one of the major obstacles 
to individual action, it is necessary to protect individuals against dismissal or other adverse treatment ...”.
10
 
 Although not expressed in terms, this suggests that at a European level, the deterrent effect (and with it 
the chilling effect) underpins the victimisation provisions. This being the case, the failure to specify third party 
victimisation appears to be an oversight rather than a deliberate exclusion. 
 
 
(ii) US Civil Rights Act 1964 
 
Concerns about access to justice, deterrents, and the chilling effect are apparent in United States case law under 
Title VII (“Employment”) of the Civil Rights Act 1964. In Robinson v Shell11 the Supreme Court stated that a 
primary purpose of the victimisation provisions is “Maintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial 
mechanisms” and consequently held that the threat of post-employment retaliation would deter victims of 
discrimination from complaining.
12
 This “fear of deterrent” purpose was presumed to include fear by other 
workers in Hashimoto v Dalton.13 Here, the Ninth Circuit held that the provision of a negative job reference in 
retaliation, which in the event did not affect the claimant’s job prospects, remained an actionable act of 
victimisation because of “the chilling effect which [the] ... retaliatory conduct might have on the remaining 
employees”14 The remedy was costs and a remedial order, but not damages.15 
 
 
(iii) Contempt of Court 
 
There are inescapable parallels with contempt of court for interfering with the administration of justice, and some 
principles there comfortably could apply to victimisation.
16
 Those who intimidate litigants or witness are liable to 
prosecution for common law
17
 (criminal) contempt. Contempt proceedings are normally brought by the Attorney-
General,
18
 and it seems, only where the intimidation is serious. This might explain why no contempt proceedings 
have brought (yet) in relation to a discrimination complaint, although this could be because of a (misplaced) belief 
that all forms of victimisation is provided for by the Equality Act.
19
 
 The High Court or Court of Appeal is empowered to punish for contempt where the contempt is in 
connection with employment tribunal proceedings.
20
 The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 2001, s.39,  
introduced a statutory variety of contempt, making it an offence to intimidate a witness (which includes the 
claimant) in civil proceedings. The intimidation can include a threat to the person, his property, finances, or 
otherwise, or any statement.
21
 Notably in this context, section 39(2)(b) provides that it is immaterial “whether that 
[intimidating] act is done to the victim himself or to another person...”. In R v Sahin,
22
 the Court of Appeal stated 
obiter that a threat to harm a litigant’s grandmother unless she dropped the case (of family proceedings and a non-
molestation order) would “inevitably” lead to a conviction under s.39.
23
 This mirrors the parallel provisions for 
criminal trials in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s.51. It was said of the similarly-worded earlier 
version of s.51(3):  
 
“‘... subsection (3) extends the offence to intimidating a third party where it is intended to intimidate the 
person concerned’ - i.e. the witness. – ‘It appears that this provision was intended to apply to threats to 
friends and families of the protected groups’ that is to say, those assisting in criminal investigations, to 
witnesses and to jurors. It deals with cases where the intimidation of a witness is achieved by threats to 
others, say, his family”.
24
  
 
Neither sections 30 nor 51 apply to proceedings in an employment tribunal;
25
 their usefulness here is to show that 
the law treats intimidation of litigants (and witnesses) seriously, and it makes no difference whether the act or 
threat is directed at the litigant or a third party. Quite obviously, the law of contempt is concerned with deterrents 
to people enforcing their legal rights, and would just as readily punish threats or harm to third parties in this cause. 
 ECJ authority, the legislative history of the equality Directives, US Civil Rights Act case law, and the 
parallel offence of contempt of court, all suggest that the deterrent mischief, and in particular the chilling effect, 
should underpin actions for victimisation provided by the Equality Act 2010. As such, the law of victimisation 
should protect third parties. 
 
 
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS IN DOMESTIC LAW 
 
Before searching for a solution with the law of victimisation, there a number of existing alternative solutions to 
consider, if only to eliminate them from this inquiry. 
 
 
A. Principal Complainant Sues 
 
(i) Damages 
 
In many of these scenarios, the principal complainant may have grounds to sue for victimisation. For instance, if a 
part-time secretary’s complaint of sexual harassment results in the dismissal of her full-time husband, it is likely 
she would suffer some financial loss in consequence. Further, she may suffer injury to her feelings for the 
emotional distress caused by her husband’s dismissal. In any case, she suffers a detriment at the hands of her 
employer because she complained of sexual harassment.
26
 The statutory formula, in principle, accommodates this 
scenario. The difficulty lies in the remedy. She may lose money because of her husband is no longer earning, but it 
will not be as much as the husband loses, something for which she cannot claim. The same logic applies to any 
distress caused. As such, this cannot provide a complete remedy. 
 
(ii) Recommendation 
 
In addition to compensation, employment tribunals may make recommendations, “for the purpose of obviating or 
reducing the adverse effect of any matter” that relates to the claimant or the workforce.
27
 This final phrase, 
introduced for the first time by the Equality Act 2010, permits tribunals to make recommendations relating to any 
deterrent effect of the employer’s act. Thus, where say, a wife is suing for sexual harassment, and then for the 
victimisation of her husband, she may get recommendation that the husband is not to be victimised because of his 
wife’s principal action for sexual harassment. This may mean, as the facts dictate, that the employer has to supply 
a job reference, or supply an accurate one, or provide the promotion or pay rise that was withheld in retaliation. 
However, this will not always provide a complete remedy. In the event of a dismissal, tribunals have been 
notoriously reluctant to order reemployment in parallel claims of unfair dismissal.
28
 A claimant would have 
another hurdle in distinguishing that established approach, especially in such acrimonious circumstances likely in 
these “vengeance” cases. 
What is clear is that even the most generous tribunal could not “make whole”
29
 the husband’s loss, and 
so could not represent a full and proper implementation of the anti-victimisation principle in third-party cases.  
 
(iii)  Exemplary damages 
 
Perhaps another way to “make whole” the husband’s loss is to award the principal complainant exemplary 
damages. Exemplary damages are not compensatory, but instead are to deter and punish the defendant. Three 
categories were identified by Lord Devlin in Rookes v Barnard.
30
 The first is oppressive, arbitrary, or 
unconstitutional behaviour by government servants.
31
 The second category arises where the defendant calculated 
that his conduct would make him a profit exceeding any compensation he would have to pay. This can apply to 
private defendants. The third is where exemplary damages are expressly authorised by statute (at present the 
discrimination legislation does not do this).
32
 
The only reported cases where exemplary damages were awarded in a discrimination claim were City of 
Bradford Metropolitan Council v Arora,
33
 and Ministry of Defence v Fletcher.
34
 These cases fell under the first 
category. The third party victimisation cases are better suited to the second category. Of the second category, Lord 
Devlin said: 
 
Where a defendant with a cynical disregard for a plaintiff’s rights has calculated that the money to be 
made out of his wrongdoing will probably exceed the damages at risk, it is necessary for the law to show 
that it cannot be broken with impunity.
35
 
 
Lord Devlin added that this is not confined to “moneymaking”, but extends to seeking a gain of some object at the 
expense of the claimant. Although no discrimination cases have been heard under this second category, there are 
examples by analogy in tort. In Design Progression v Thurloe
36
 a landlord was ordered to pay £25,000 for 
delaying (for financial gain) in consenting to the assignment of a lease, in breach of the Landlord and Tenant Act 
1988, s.1(3) (a statutory tort). The award was to “mark the court’s disapproval” and “cause the defendant to 
consider seriously its future conduct”.
37
 And in Drane v Evangelou,
38
 a landlord was ordered to pay £1000 to an 
unlawfully evicted tenant for trespass. 
In third party victimisation cases, the employer commits a statutory tort (the “wrongdoing”) by 
victimising the principal claimant using her loved one, relative, or friend. The tangible harm done to the claimant 
is likely to be the distress, the deterrent effect, and perhaps pecuniary loss caused by a spouse and/or principal 
household earner losing his or her job. In so acting, the employer is trying to profit (or at least avoid a loss), and/or 
obtain some other object, by pressurising her into dropping her complaint. And even if the employer’s act failed to 
deter the claimant, an award would make the employer (and other employers) “consider seriously its future 
conduct”. The parent Directives appear ambivalent towards exemplary damages, providing that sanctions “must be 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive”.
39
 It is arguable that damages should be “proportionate” to the claimant’s 
loss. But it is equally arguable that to be “dissuasive” an award could include exemplary damages. 
However, awards of exemplary damages are by no means certain in English law, and even less so in 
discrimination cases. In the most recent House of Lords case to discuss the matter, Kuddus v Chief Constable of 
Leicestershire Constabulary,
40
 the speeches were equivocal over the merit and status of exemplary damages. 
Whilst generally endorsing and developing the remedy, Lord Nicholls noted it was one “of last resort”.
41
  Lord 
Mackay stated that exemplary damages should not be awarded in discrimination cases unless expressly authorised 
by statute,
42
 whilst Lord Hutton preferred to reserve his opinion on discrimination until the matter came before 
him.
43
 Lord Scott said he would be “receptive” to an argument that that exemplary damages in civil cases should 
be abolished.
44
 A further uncertainty is their calculation, which is not subject to “nice legal principles”
45
 or 
“weighed in nice scales”.
46
  The only guidelines suggest that it should not matter if the defendant’s wrongful act 
did not produce the desired effect (in this case deterring the claimant from pursuing the complaint), because the 
main purpose is to deter future wrongful conduct. The award must be “moderate”, and not “excessive”. Otherwise, 
the award is calculated “to mark the displeasure of the court”.
47
 Third party victimisation is certainly apt for 
exemplary damages. But the equivocation over the existence of such damages in discrimination cases, and to a 
lesser degree, over their calculation, does not provide a sound, reliable, predictable legal remedy for third party 
victimisation.  
 
 
B. The Victim Sues 
 
(i) Third Party Discrimination 
 
Another tempting solution is to develop the seemingly elastic concept of “association discrimination”, which is a 
form of discrimination on the ground of a third party’s protected characteristic. The extensive reach of this notion 
was highlighted in a case concerning direct discrimination and harassment. In Coleman v Attridge Law
48
 the ECJ 
held that abusing and badly treating a worker because of her child’s disability amounted to harassment of, and 
discrimination against, the worker, even though she had no disability: the conduct was on the ground of disability, 
and that was enough. By way of analogy, should not the victim of third party retaliation be able to sue because of 
his association with the principal complainant? The obvious objection is that the statutory definition of 
victimisation is not as facilitating as the harassment and direct discrimination formulas. As noted above, it 
specifies that the principal complainant and the victim are the same person. It now becomes tempting to stretch the 
Coleman principle of discrimination to cover these third party victimisation scenarios. For instance, where a white 
woman is dismissed because of her black husband’s racial discrimination complaint, is she not suffering in much 
the same way as Ms Coleman? The difficulty with this approach is that it would in fact encompass all 
victimisation claims, and so leave the victimisation provisions stranded with no purpose. An interpretation that 
renders a section redundant should not stand. 
Coleman is useful in this context to illustrate that third party victimisation is - conceptually - no more 
ground-breaking than the established notion of third party discrimination. Thus, “association discrimination” may 
prove influential, but it offers no immediate solution for a third party victimisation claim. 
 
 
(ii) Unfair Dismissal 
 
Where the retaliation amounts to a dismissal, a seemingly obvious alternative claim would be for unfair dismissal. 
Again, here the actual victim is suing. It is most unlikely that an employer could argue that a dismissal - taken out 
of vengeance, or to deter the principal complainant, or others - was fair. The limits to this remedy are where: the 
victim does not have the requisite one year’s qualifying service, the claim exceeds the statutory cap,
49
 the claim 
includes injury to feelings,
50
 or of course, where the treatment falls short of dismissal. In these cases, an unfair 
dismissal claim will not be available, or where it is, it will provide an incomplete remedy. 
Whilst these alternatives show that with some imagination, tribunals have it within themselves to address 
third party victimisation, the theories and remedies are either uncertain or incomplete, or both. Thus, we must look 
further afield for a solution. 
 
 
3. EU LAW 
 
The parent equality Directives are the Race Directive, the “Framework” Directive (covering religion or belief, 
sexual orientation, disability, and age), and the “Recast” Gender Equality Directive. The history of their 
victimisation formulas can be traced to Coote v Granada,51 although they were not drafted expressly to address the 
deterrent mischief, nor the chilling effect and third party victimisation. 
 
Race Directive 2000/43/EC
52
 
 
Preamble: (20) The effective implementation of the principle of equality requires adequate judicial 
protection against victimisation. 
 
Article 9 
Victimisation 
Member States shall introduce into their national legal systems such measures as are necessary to protect 
individuals from any adverse treatment or adverse consequence as a reaction to a complaint or to 
proceedings aimed at enforcing compliance with the principle of equal treatment. 
 
The Framework Directive
53
 contains the same Recital in its preamble, but the formula is couched in more 
restrictive terms:  
 
Member States shall introduce ...  measures as are necessary to protect employees against dismissal or 
other adverse treatment by the employer as a reaction to a complaint within the undertaking or to any 
legal proceedings aimed at enforcing compliance with the principle of equal treatment. 
 
The formula in the Recast Directive
54
 is substantially the same.  
Although not expressed to do so, the Race Directive’s formula is broadly expressed and open enough to 
cover all three Classes of the third party victimisation scenarios.
55
 It requires adverse treatment as a reaction to a 
discrimination complaint or proceedings. There is nothing else limiting in this formula. But this openness could be 
explained by the Directive’s reach, which covers areas beyond employment, such as the provision of goods and 
services. This becomes apparent upon reading the other equality Directives, which are confined to employment 
matters. The Framework and Gender Directives share a common, but narrower, formula. This readily covers the 
first two Classes, but not the third.  
With these limits, the ECJ - and indeed domestic tribunals - may need convincing to identify the 
underlying principles to the victimisation provisions. As such, they may look further afield for influences and 
guidance. The possibilities include the law of the United States, the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
International Labour Organisation, European Social Charter, and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well 
and the EU’s general principles of effective judicial protection and equality. 
 
 
A.  The United States Experience 
 
There are many reported cases of third party victimisation the United States, where the courts face the same 
narrowly drafted statutory formula, which specifies that the victim and claimant should be the same person. The 
“retaliation” provision of the Civil Rights Act 1964, Title VII, prohibits less favourable treatment of a worker 
“because he has...” opposed discrimination or participated in discrimination proceedings.
56
 Although there appears 
to be a consensus around the deterrent mischief (see above),
57
 the Federal Circuits are split over third party 
victimisation. Some have taken a purposive approach recognising victimisation against someone “so closely 
related to or associated with the [plaintiff] ...  that it would discourage that person from pursuing [her claim]”.
58
 It 
is upon this basis that the Federal enforcement body, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 
Compliance Manual supports the recognition of third party victimisation.
59
 Courts have found liability where a 
wife was refused a job because her husband “agitated against discrimination”,
60
 or where a husband was fired 
because of his wife’s complaint of sexual harassment.
61
  
But other US courts take the literal approach and do not recognise such claims, for instance, where a 
worker’s partner was refused a promised return from maternity leave because he had made complaints of racial 
harassment.
62
 There are yet no reported cases in the UK. This disparity in reported incidents is probably explained 
by the fire-at-will doctrine prevalent in the US, where there is little or no protection against unfair dismissal. Some 
US courts fear that recognising third party victimisation would put an abnormal duty on employers to justify 
dismissals, save a dismissed worker suddenly claims to be somehow connected with the principal complaint.
63
 
This is not to say that the problem of third party victimisation does not exist in the UK, as unfair dismissal is far 
from a complete remedy, as noted above. 
The lesson from these cases is that it is possible distort a statutory formula in order to achieve the 
statutory purpose, in this context, recognising actions that would deter workers from complaining about 
discrimination. This is common practice under the Civil Rights Act 1964, and occasionally practised in the UK, 
although mainly under the authority of EU law. The resistance in the US to this approach is rooted, it seems, in 
deference to the fire-at-will doctrine, which of course is much less prevalent in the UK and the EU. 
 
 
B. International Charters and Conventions 
 
Of the social and economic instruments, the equality provisions provide nothing specific for third party 
victimisation, whilst those addressing unjustified dismissal are equivocal in their status and/or application. The 
International Labour Organisation’s Convention 158 on unjustified dismissal is heavily qualified and has been 
adjudged to allow qualification or “probation” periods of at least one year, as well as limits on awards.
64
 The same 
is true of the EC’s Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 30, which prohibits unjustified dismissal, but only “in 
accordance with Community law and national laws and practices”, which takes it no further than the existing 
domestic provisions for unfair dismissal. Further, the UK has not ratified C158, and “opted out” of the Charter.
65
 
Article 24 of the European Social Charter (the social and economic companion to the European Convention on 
Human Rights) is unequivocal in its application, recognising “day-one” unfair dismissal rights
66
 and full 
compensation,
67
 but again has an equivocal status, as it has not been ratified by the UK.   
Perhaps the most surprising candidate with the potential to recognise third party victimisation is Article 
8, of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), with provides the right to privacy. Here, the European 
Court of Human Rights and the House of Lords has held that an exclusion from a chosen career, or a “large sector 
of the job market” could interfere with one’s ability to establish and develop human relationships and with it one’s 
private life.
68
 In some rare cases, a dismissal from a job in a particularly narrow profession, and/or with stigma 
(e.g. by association with a “troublemaker”) could have that effect. 
It would seem that a court - be it the ECJ or an employment tribunal - can draw little of substance from 
the international documents, although Article 8, ECHR, may offer a solution in some rare instances.  
 
 
C. General Principles of EU Law 
 
The development of the victimisation provisions in the equality Directives are underpinned by two complimentary 
principles relevant here. First, the prohibition of deterrents to workers using the discrimination legislation 
(Coote).69 Second, remedies must be sufficient to deter employers from discriminating (Marshall),
70
 or be 
“dissuasive”, as the discrimination Directives instruct with their “Sanctions” articles.
71
 It was noted above that the 
wording of the victimisation provisions in these Directives (save perhaps the Race Directive) is not broad enough 
to cover all the third party scenarios, notably those involving a second employer. What is required is an 
overarching general principle which is not bound by the niceties of the legislative formulas. 
In 1986, the ECJ in Johnston v RUC
72
 expressed the view that Equal Treatment Directive 76/207/EEC 
(ETD),
73
 Article 6 (effective remedy) “reflects a general principle of law”.
74
 We then saw Coote building on 
Johnston and Article 6 to establish the now-familiar rubric prohibiting victimisation, expressed in the 
discrimination Directives. Johnston and Coote concerned access to Court. Marshall built upon Article 6 to provide 
access to a full remedy.
75
 Finally, in Francovich,
76
 the ECJ created a new cause of action in order to provide an 
effective remedy under EC law.
77
 
What becomes apparent is that Article 6 (ETD), the deterrent mischief expressed in Coote and Marshall, 
the “dissuasive” principle, and prohibitions against victimisation in the discrimination Directives, are merely 
specific expressions of a general principle of judicial protection.
78
 As such, their precise wording should not 
restrict the general principle. That would be the tail wagging the dog. Quite clearly, if third party victimisation can 
occur without redress, or with only partial redress, the claimant is deterred from seeking a remedy and the 
employer is not dissuaded from intimidating her. This applies equally across all the scenarios. Thus, this general 
principle provides the most solid ground for a remedy to all three Classes of third party victimisation.  
Thus, the victim should be permitted to sue, even if this means creating a new cause of action 
(Francovich). For some reason the victim may not sue. This may occur where, for example, the employer merely 
threatens to dismiss the claimant’s spouse, should the claimant not abandon her claim. Here, principal claimant 
should be able to sue her employer and claim damages enough to dissuade the employer.
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Just as the victimisation and sanctions provisions are expressions of the general principle of effective 
judicial protection, there are expressions of the general principle of equality. This simply reinforces the importance 
of the equality principle, and with it, its enforcement. This can only be achieved by addressing the mischief of the 
deterrent effect. In Swedex,
80
 the ECJ relied on this principle to hold that the Framework Directive should be 
enforceable between private parties.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Quite clearly, the victimisation provisions ought to cover the deterrent effect, the chilling effect, and third party 
victimisation. It is equally clear that the domestic version falls short of this. The alternative solutions of remedies 
for the principal claimant, or alternative cause of action for the victim, are either inadequate or uncertain, or both. 
The solution lies in EU jurisprudence. With the purpose of the Directives in mind, there are a number of 
factors which would push the ECJ towards recognising these claims. First, the general principle of judicial 
protection, which is broad enough to create a new cause of action if necessary. This factor alone should be enough. 
Second, the twin principles already associated with enforcement of removing deterrents to complainants and 
potential complainants (the chilling effect), and dissuading employers from intimidating them. Third, the 
recognition of third party victimisation is - conceptually - no more ground-breaking than the already recognised 
third party discrimination and harassment (Coleman). Fourth, when faced with the issue, some United States 
Federal Courts have taken a purposive approach (and the restrictive approach by other US courts could be 
explained by the fire-at-will doctrine). Fifth, in principle, third party victimisation can amount to common law 
contempt (expressly recognised by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 2001). Last, there is potential in 
Article 8 (ECHR) jurisprudence to cover some cases. Other potential influences -  the international Charters and 
Conventions mentioned - are, at best, equivocal on the issue and in their status. 
It is clear, that to address third party victimisation, a new definition of victimisation is required with this 
express purpose. The obvious solution is to rephrase the domestic formula to read “and does so by reason that a 
person has [done a protected act]”. This still requires a causal link (“because”) between the protected act and the 
unfavourable treatment, and so this open formula should not fall prey to a number of meritless claims. 
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